THE REFORM OF UNITED NATIONS PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM

BY

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The Reform of United Nations Peace Support Operations in the New Millennium

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ABSTRACT

This paper discusses UN attempts at reforming peace support operations in the new millennium. It begins with a short introduction examining the history of UN peacekeeping with a look at the difficulties, missteps, and lessons learned in the post-cold war era of the 1990s as peace support operations expanded from traditional monitoring and observation missions to more multi-dimensional endeavors. It moves on to reviewing a series of UN reform documents, beginning with the much heralded “Brahimi Report,” first published in 2000, and ending with the recent and ongoing New Horizon Initiative.
INTRODUCTION

The History and Evolution of UN Peacekeeping 1948-2000

Since the inception of United Nations Peacekeeping missions, three core principles have guided the operations of all missions. They are: consent of the parties to the presence of peacekeepers, impartiality in implementation of the peacekeeping mandate, and a very restricted use of force. For some time the use of force was limited to self-defense. The latter principle has since evolved to encompass not only self-defense, but defense of civilian non-combatants and enforcement (defense) of the UN mandate. UN missions are also now routinely referred to as “Peace Support Operations,” as modern day UN missions involving more than just keeping the peace, to include conflict prevention and mediation, peacemaking, peace enforcement, and peacebuilding activities.1

Early peacekeeping missions were begun to support the UN’s founding purpose of maintaining international security and ending the “scourge of war.”2 Initial missions were similar to those belonging to the UN’s precursor, the League of Nations, which sent unarmed observers to report on the adherence to an armistice or peace agreement by former fighting states. The first two missions – the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) in the Middle East and the UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) – both followed these practices. It wasn’t until the UN Emergency Force (UNEF I) deployed in 1956 to address the Suez Crisis that the UN began sending armed contingents. To emphasize their “peaceful” intent, they were called “peacekeepers,” with their purpose being to serve as a buffer between Israeli and Egyptian forces.

The UN helped keep the peace by serving, in its own estimation, as an independent and objective party that had the putative will of the international community behind it. Early
UN missions occurred in the global context of the Cold War between NATO and Warsaw Pact countries and were relatively simple affairs mainly limited to helping keep a pre-established peace once ceasefires had already been declared or peace treaties had been signed. They included tasks such as observation and monitoring, confidence building activities, and support to both the existing peace process and political resolution of the underlying issues causing the conflict. Many of these missions, such those in the Middle East and Kashmir, continue to this day because these conflicts remain unresolved with occasional relapses into violence. Others have ended or have been replaced with subsequent UN missions.3

The nature of UN peacekeeping dramatically changed in the 1990s after the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of a bipolar world where the greatest threat to international security was major interstate war. In the new era of intrastate conflicts that followed, such as those in Somalia, Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, peace support operations mandated by the UN Security Council were widely viewed as failures for their inability to maintain peace, enforce the UN mandate, and protect civilians.

In the case of Rwanda an existing UN force stood by while over 800,000 people were killed in around 100 days during the 1994 genocide. Throughout the Bosnian war, UN forces were ineffective in enforcing both UN Security Council resolutions and maintaining agreed upon ceasefires by the combatants. And despite the UN Security Council designation of Srebrenica as a “safe area,” and the deployment of a battalion of Dutch soldiers to the city, the UN failed to protect the inhabitants, who were overrun in July 2005 by Serb military forces who then massacred approximately 7000 males of military age.

Many commentators, both within the UN and outside observers, argue these operations were set up for failure by ill-conceived and unclear mission mandates approved by the Security
Council, along with unwillingness on the part of the military peacekeeping forces to use force in defense of the mandate, and a severe lack of resources. The large scale of the missions and their multinational character created additional problems with deployed units from a variety of countries lacking interoperability, both in terms of equipment packages and shared understanding of the mandate and rules of engagement. And though UN peacekeeping missions call for all UN forces to adhere to instructions of the UN force commander, national contingent leadership very often continued to look to their own national capitals for guidance on even the smallest issues.

Beginning in the mid-90s the UN engaged in a series of evaluations examining the evolving nature of UN peacekeeping in the new post-cold war political environment, issuing reports on the missions in Somalia, Bosnia, and Rwanda and examining the lessons that could be learned from them. The process reached its zenith when Secretary General Kofi Annan called upon UN Diplomat and former Algerian Foreign Minister Lakhdar Brahimi to convene a panel to look at ways to improve UN Peacekeeping, both at UN headquarters and in the field. The resulting “Brahimi Report,” which was released in August 2000, ushered in a new era of self-reflection and reform within the UN’s Department of Peacekeeping, and among relevant UN bodies that oversee peacekeeping, such as the Secretariat and the Security Council.

This paper examines UN attempts at peacekeeping reform since 2000, beginning with the Brahimi Report, and ending with the current New Horizon Initiative. It seeks to identify key changes that have occurred in the past decade in the way the UN organizes for peace support operations and synthesize the major lessons learned in the new peacekeeping era. Also looked at are the current and future challenges that must be addressed in order for peace support operations to be most effective.
As will be seen, in the twenty years since the end of the Cold War UN peace support missions have evolved from the “traditional” observation and interposition missions of the Cold War era to today’s “multidimensional” missions. In the current environment, peacekeepers are also often tasked with significant post-conflict reconstruction and state-building activities. A recent further complication of peacekeeping is the added mission requirement of “protection of civilians,” though often with the caveat of language limiting the scope of this tasking to the mission’s operational areas and whatever the peacekeeping force is deemed capable of. Yet too often UN missions are still hamstrung by ill-conceived and unclear mission mandates, an unwillingness of the peacekeeping intervention forces to engage in robust use of force to include pre-emptive action, and a lack of resources, both in terms of material and personnel.

How Peacekeeping Missions are Started and Implemented

According to the UN Charter, the Security Council has primarily responsibility for the maintenance of international security and peace, which includes designing and approving mandates for peace support operations, traditionally know as “peacekeeping missions.”

The Security Council is made up of 15 countries, only five of which are permanent members with veto power over any resolutions. Article 24 of the Charter states that the members of the UN “confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf.” Article 25 then goes on to state that UN member nations “agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council,” thereby binding them to implement its decisions. Articles 48 and 49 reiterate this point.
When the Security Council determines that there exists a threat to or breach of peace or an act of aggression, it can take two different types of action to maintain or restore international peace and security. Both forms fall under Chapter VII, Articles 41 and 42, of the Charter.

Under Article 41, the UN can take measures not involving the use of armed force, such as economic sanctions, the severance of diplomatic ties, or rail, sea, air and communication blockades. However, when the Security Council invokes Article 42 it allows for “such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security.” The Security Council can only resort to force if it determines that the measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have proven to be ineffective in maintaining international peace and security.

When a situation arises that may require a peace support operation, the first thing the UN does is engage in a series of consultations to include:

- All relevant United Nations actors
- The potential host government and the parties on the ground
- Member States, including States that might contribute troops and police to a peacekeeping operation
- Regional and other intergovernmental organizations
- Other relevant key external partners

During this consultation period an on-the-ground technical assessment is usually conducted to provide perspective and context for the Security Council before it has to make a decision. The consultations and assessment also provide an opportunity for reviewing all the
options available to the Security Council and bringing into the fold actors who have the ability to influence the design and implementation of a future mandate.

According to the UN’s Department of Peacekeeping Operations:

*The assessment mission analyzes and assesses the overall security, political, military, humanitarian and human rights situation on the ground, and its implications for a possible operation. Based on the findings and recommendations of the assessment mission, the UN Secretary-General will issue a report to the Security Council. This report will present options for the establishment of a peacekeeping operation as appropriate including its size and resources. The report will also include financial implications and statement of preliminary estimated costs.*

After the Security Council has received the assessment report and finished with its deliberations, it either passes a resolution establishing a peacekeeping mission or refrains from doing so. If it chooses to do so, is must set out “the operation’s mandate and size, and details the tasks it will be responsible for performing.” The UN General Assembly then has the responsibility for approving the budget and resources for the missions.

Following a resolution by the Security Council, the UN Secretary-General, with Security Council approval, appoints a “Head of Mission.” For multi-dimensional missions he usually receives the designation of “Special Representative of the Secretary General” and is required to report the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations at UN Headquarters in New York.
York. The Secretary-General is also responsible for appointing the UN’s Force Commander and Police Commissioner, in addition to other selected senior staff.

After being appointed, the Head of Mission and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), in conjunction with the Department of Field Support (DFS), the administrative and logistical support organization for UN field operations, begin planning the peacekeeping mission. An Integrated Mission Task Force (IMTF) is also established, bringing together other UN offices, agencies and programs that will be involved in the operation as well as outside agencies and activities such as NGOs that may be working in the mission area.

The role of the DPKO is to develop the mission plan, generate the required forces and capabilities, and provide executive direction and policy support to PSOs. The DPKO also integrates both UN and non-UN organizations in a common effort towards achieving the missions mandate. The goal is a fully integrated mission to achieve unity of effort. DPKO is divided into four units: the Office of Operations, which provides policy and operational guidance; the Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions, which deals with issues related to police, justice and corrections, mine action, and disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of former combatants (DDR); the Office of Military Affairs, which works to deploy military capability and “enhance performance and improve the efficiency and the effectiveness of military components in United Nations Peacekeeping missions”; and finally, the Policy Evaluation and Training Division, which seeks to “evaluate mission progresses towards mandate implementation” and support the training of those involved in peacekeeping missions. The role of the Department of Field Support (DFS) is to provide support in “the areas of finance, logistics, information, communication and technology (ICT), human resources and general administration” to UN missions.10
While UN missions seek to deploy as quickly as possible, they cannot do so without the requisite resources in place, which has been problematic in the past. Resource availability is highly dependent upon the cooperation of troop contributing countries and the speed at which both the General Assembly and member nations move in providing the necessary resources. In the interim, between the time the mission is mandated and the main force arrives in an operational area, an advance party is usually able to deploy and to begin setting up the mission headquarters and establishing site security in addition to the network of local support contracts necessary to sustain the incoming mission.

Once the main UN forces are on the ground and are working towards achieving the mandate, regular reports and consultations will be made with UN headquarters to apprise them of the mission’s current status and seek additional guidance and resources as necessary. Eventually a time will come where the mandate will be ended, or perhaps altered and extended, or transitioned to a new force, such as a regional organization, depending upon events on the ground.

A DECADE OF REFORM

The Brahimi Report and the Beginnings of Reform

After a series of peacekeeping operations in the 1990s that were widely seen as failures to protect civilian life or achieve their mandates, along with the arrival of new, unprecedented UN peacekeeping responsibilities in Kosovo and East Timor in 1999, and the prospect of additional UN missions in Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan in March 2000 appointed a high-level panel to “undertake a thorough review of United Nations peace and security activities, and to present a clear set of specific, concrete and
practical recommendations to assist the United Nations in conducting such activities better in the future.”

The Chairman of that Panel, Lakhdar Brahimi, the former Foreign Minister of Algeria and a former SRSG for the UN Peacekeeping Mission in Haiti (UNMIH), convened a group of high-level experts in peace support operations and five months later they transmitted to the Secretary-General their Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, otherwise known as the Brahimi Report. It was seen by some observers at the time as “one last chance” to reverse vocal criticism and declining support for UN peacekeeping missions and implement reforms that were not made following the mission failures in Rwanda, Bosnia, and Somalia, after which UN member states appeared to write off the UN as an appropriate vehicle for peacekeeping or peace enforcement missions.

Giving it additional impetus were failures in the on-going UN peacekeeping mission in Sierra Leone during the Panel’s deliberations, which had a mandate to oversee implementation of a peace agreement that ended that country’s eight-year civil war. In May 2000 approximately 500 Kenyan and Zambian peacekeepers were taken hostage by the rebel group Revolutionary United Front (RUF). The rebels claimed they took the peacekeepers hostage because UN troops were forcibly disarming RUF fighters - a charge U.N. officials would later deny. The peacekeepers were later released, but a review of the crisis revealed in stark terms the potential catastrophic failures that exist when peacekeeping units are improperly resourced or trained, and have unclear understandings about the extent of their mandate and the proper use of force.

The goal of the Brahimi Report, released to the public in August 2000, and which Secretary-General Annan called “frank yet fair,” was to take an unflinching look at PSO
implementation problems within the UN system and then offer, in words of Brahimi, “specific and realistic recommendations” for enhancing UN capacity for Peace Support Operations. “This degree of self-criticism,” Brahimi noted in his introduction to the report, “is rare for any large organization and particularly rare for the United Nations.”

The beginning of the report pulled no punches. “Over the last decade,” it said, “the United Nations has repeatedly failed to meet the challenge [of peacekeeping]; and it can do no better today.” It went on to say that:

“Without significant institutional change, increased financial support, and renewed commitment on the part of Member States, the United Nations will not be capable of executing the critical peacekeeping and peace-building tasks that the Member States assign it in coming months and years.”

In order to meet these challenges the report identified three key conditions for success that every single mission must have:

- Political Support;
- Rapid deployment with a robust force posture; and
- Sound peace-building strategy

Every recommendation in the report is tied, in one way or another, to helping meet these three conditions.
The Panel stressed the importance of Member States taking seriously their responsibility to support and adequately resource PSO missions once the Security Council has decided to issue a peacekeeping mandate. Failure to do so, they noted, leads to a lack of credibility for forces on the ground, an erosion of the UN’s legitimacy as an intervention force, and the tarnishing of the organization’s image among those it is striving to help.

The bulk of the report is divided into six sections. The first introduces the report and provides the rationale for change while the following four cover current shortcomings and present specific recommendations upon which to act. The final section is on challenges to the implementation of reforms.

The sections dealing specifically with reform focus on:

- Doctrine, strategy and decision-making for peace operations;
- United Nations capacities to deploy operations rapidly and effectively;
- Headquarters resources and structure for planning and supporting peacekeeping operations; and,
- Peace operations and the information age

There are 57 different recommendations in the report, the most important of which deal with 1) improving the mandate formation process; 2) ensuring the rapid and effective deployment of forces; and 3) shifting doctrine to account for the new realities of modern day multidimensional peace support operations. In the interest of brevity, this paper will deal with these three categories individually and in-depth as it is crucial they be addressed if UN peace support operations are to succeed.
Improving the Mandate Formation Process

Perhaps the key problem at the start of any peacekeeping missions is how to form a mandate that is clear, credible, and achievable. Too often in the past UN Security Council mandates have lacked these criteria. Part of the reason for this were the compromises that needed to be made at the Security Council level to achieve consensus in what are essentially political documents, which resulted in overly general and ambiguous mandates that had many degrees of interpretation, some conflicting, and which then led to negative consequences in the field. As the *Brahimi Report* notes, such lack of specificity allows certain “local actors [to] perceive a less than complete [Security] Council commitment to peace implementation that offers encouragement to spoilers.”\(^{17}\) The report comes out strongly against such ambiguity. “Rather than send an operation into danger with unclear instructions,” it says, “the Panel urges that the [Security] Council refrain from mandating such a mission.”\(^{18}\)

In its report the panel also advises that when it comes to requests for United Nations implementation of cease fire or peace agreements, there need to be “certain minimum conditions before the [Security] Council commits United Nations-led forces to implement such accords.”\(^{19}\)

These are:

- Having the opportunity to have advisor-observers present at the peace negotiations;
• Ensuring any agreement is consistent with prevailing international human rights standards and international law; and

• That the tasks assigned to the United Nations are operationally achievable “with local responsibility for supporting them specified” and that they “either contribute to addressing the sources of conflict or provide the space required for others to do so.”

Once a mandate is under serious consideration by the Security Council, the report calls upon the Secretariat (the Secretary-General’s office) to set forth a realistic assessment of what resources would be needed to achieve the mission. Too often, they suggest, the Secretariat puts forth resource levels “according to what it presumes to be acceptable to the Council politically.”20 This sets up the mission for not only failure, but allows the Security Council to scapegoat the Secretariat if the mission does not succeed. “Although presenting and justifying planning estimates according to high operational standards might reduce the likelihood of an operation going forward,” says the Report, “Member States must not be led to believe that they are doing something useful for countries in trouble when – by under-resourcing missions – they are more likely agreeing to a waste of human resources, time and money.”21

One key finding in the Brahimi Report is that the Security Council not approve a mandate until the Secretary-General has obtained promises from Member State for the forces necessary to carry out the mission. To do so risks deploying a partial force unable to secure the peace, unduly raising and then dashing “the hopes of a population engulfed in conflict or recovering from war, and damaging the credibility of the United Nations as a whole.”22 Until the necessary
commitments can be made from Member States, the Panel recommends keeping any Security Council resolution in draft form.

In summary, the report’s recommendations on mandate formation are:

- Ensuring certain “threshold conditions,” exist before issuing a mandate, such as making sure tasks and timelines assigned to peacekeeping forces are achievable and ensuring former combatants agree to adhere to international human rights standards;
- Leaving resolutions in draft form until the Secretary-General has from Member States a solid commitments of the forces and other resources necessary to implement the PSO mission;
- Making Security Council resolutions meet the requirement of peacekeeping operations when deployed to dangerous situations, “especially the need for a clear chain of command and unity of effort”; and finally,
- Having the Secretariat tell the Security Council “what it needs to know, not what it wants to hear, when formulating or changing mission mandates,” and allowing countries access to Secretariat briefings to the Security Council “on matters affecting the safety and security of their personnel, especially those meeting with implications for a mission’s use of force.”

UN mandate formulation is a process that can be politically difficult and controversial. For these reasons and others Security Council resolutions may often be overly vague in their description of the mandate and tasks assigned to peacekeeping forces, which creates
opportunities for spoilers to disrupt the overall purpose of the mission and troop contributing
countries the leeway necessary to avoid taking certain actions if they deem it not in their interest
to do so. For a PSO to succeed, the founding requirement must be a properly formulated mission
mandate, one that sets out specific and achievable tasks with appropriate timelines, is sufficiently
resourced, and is above all, clear in the purposes and goals of the mission. To get to this point a
great deal of planning and consultation needs to be done before the Security Council passes a
resolution (i.e., mandate), and it must have accurate estimates of the required force levels to
achieve the potential mandate. Without a realistic and properly resourced mandate, future
peacekeeping missions stand a greater chance of failure with the attendant negative impacts on
both the beneficiaries’ of the mission and the UN organization as a whole.

**Ensuring the Rapid and Effective Deployment of Forces**

The United Nations possess no standby military or police force and no on-call reserve corps of
civilian leaders who are ready, willing and able to jump in at a moment’s notice to staff a peace
support mission. Yet it does have a very small cadre of individual military and civilian experts
serving in an on-call capacity. As a result of the lack of a standby force, the UN must rely on the
good will and support of Members States to provide the necessary personnel, monetary, and
equipment resources needed to undertake a peacekeeping operation.

The UN does maintain a Standby Arrangements System (UNSAS) to identify potential
field staff, yet as noted in the *Brahimi Report*, this is not a dependable source of personnel. The
UN also maintains a Logistics Base (UNLB) in Brindisi, Italy, but this stockpile is not always
sufficient for new missions. Some of the additional challenges identified by the *Brahimi Report*
were a peacekeeping procurement process that did not “adequately balance its responsibilities for
cost-effectiveness and financial responsibility against overriding operations needs for timely response and mission credibility,” and the Secretary-General’s lack of authority to acquire, hire, and preposition “the goods and people needed to deploy an operation rapidly before the Security Council adopts the resolution to establish it, however likely such an operation may seem.”24

One other issue impacting PSO staffing is defining what exactly constitutes “rapid and effective deployment.” According to the Report, “the first six to 12 weeks following ceasefire or peace accord is often the most critical period for establishing both a stable peace and the credibility of the peacekeepers.”25 For this reason the Panel recommends that PSO missions deploy within this time line. “Credibility and political momentum lost during this period,” the authors’ state, “can often be difficult to regain. Deployment timelines should thus be tailored accordingly.”26 The Panel then distinguishes between two deployment timelines, one for “traditional” peacekeeping missions and one for more complex ones. For traditional PSOs, the recommendation is that forces be deployed within 30 days while for complex PSOs it is 90 days with a headquarters element for the latter to be “fully installed and functioning within 15 days.”27

The Report notes the difficulties inherent in marshaling forces and caveats its desire for quickness with the need for effectiveness. The “speedy deployment of military, civilian police and civilian expertise will not help to solidify a fragile peace and establish the credibility of an operation if these personnel are not equipped to do their job,” it says.28 In addition to personnel, a mission needs suitable equipment, finances, information assets, and an operational strategy to move the peace process forward. If the proposed timelines are to be met, the Report notes, the Secretariat “must be able to maintain a certain generic level of preparedness, through the
establishment of new standing capacities and enhancement of existing standby capacities, so as to be prepared for unseen demands.\textsuperscript{29}

Though the report identifies the need for establishing deployment timelines and it certainly makes sense to get peacekeeping missions on the ground as quickly as possible after a conflict has ended, it seems unlikely that the UN will be ready to do so regularly. As the panel notes:

\textit{Many Members States have argued against the establishment of a standing United Nations army or police force, resisted entering into reliable standby arrangements, cautioned against the incursion of financial expenses for building a reserve of equipment or discouraged the Secretariat from undertaking planning for potential operations prior to the Secretary-General having been granted specific, crisis-driven legislative authority to do so. Under these circumstances, the United Nations cannot deploy operations “rapidly and effectively” within the timelines suggested.}\textsuperscript{30}

While recognizing the UN may never resolve the problem of Members States not wanting to fund or man a UN standby force or contribute resources to potential missions for which there is no Security Council Resolution, the Report’s authors recommend several ways the UN can help close the gap between when a resolution is passed and when forces arrive on the ground, most of which involve identifying personnel and resources ahead of time in addition to planning deployments and mission strategy once a missions seems likely.
As discussed earlier, the UN maintains a series of “standby” arrangements with potential troop contributing countries in order to have forces ready in the event an operation is established. However, not all of these standby arrangement forces are adequately trained or equipped to meet mission requirements. For this reason, the Panel recommended that “the Secretariat send a team to confirm the readiness of each potential troop contributor to meet the requisite United Nations training and equipment requirements for peacekeeping operations, prior to deployment.”³¹

The Report also recommended the creation of various on-call lists of personnel, including at least “100 experienced, well qualified military officers, carefully vetted and accepted by DPKO,” in addition to lists of civilian police, international judicial experts, human rights experts, and a variety of other positions needed during peace support operations.

One of the most significant changes recommended in the Report involve improving the UN’s procurement procedures so as to facilitate rapid deployment. The Panel recommended that responsibilities for peacekeeping budgeting and procurement be placed in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, rather than the Department of Management. As we shall see a little later, the UN embraced this sort of change and went one step further, creating a separate Department of Field Support to work on procurement and budget issues. Along with realigning responsibilities the Panel called for a wholesale overhaul of existing procurement policies and procedures in order to streamline them, as well as provide for greater flexibility and delegation to field. It also urged the Security-General to design and submit for approval to the General Assembly a “global logistics support strategy governing the stockpiling of equipment reserves and standing contracts with the private sector for common goods and services.”³² It also recommended that at the United Nations Logistics Base in Brindisi, Italy, there be additional “start-up kits” of the essential equipment needed for peace support operations.³³
Finally, the Panel called for giving the Secretary-General the ability to commit (with the approval of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ) up to $50 million dollars towards establishing a new PSO mission if it “becomes clear that an operation is likely to be established.”

**Accounting for the Realities of Modern Day Multi-Dimensional PSOs**

After the two main hurdles of having a clear, credible mandate and deploying forces rapidly and effectively have been resolved comes the truly hard part: effectively carrying out the peace support operation until it is ready to close or transition.

Modern PSOs are not like those of times past which involved mainly the observation and monitoring of relatively small number of individuals. Not only has the spectrum of tasks increased, but they have also evolved into exceedingly complex affairs that take place under the microscope of global, around-the-clock media environment and involve a much wider range of actors besides the combating forces and the UN. These include other international and regional organizations, foreign governments, non-government organizations of all types, media organizations, and many more local and foreign actors who have become more empowered by the rise of internet communications technology and mobile telephony. Today’s PSOs also require the ability to use force in defense of the UN mandate and to protect civilians if necessary, since the authority and neutrality of peacekeepers is not universally regarded as valid. Finally, because of the size of UN forces, the complexity of the operation, and the number of groups to be integrated, there is a greater need for good leadership, better equipment, and more training at all mission levels.
Perhaps the two most important issues facing the UN are what to do when civilian life is threatened and what to do when one or more actors are not adhering to the mandate or peace agreement. These have become more important after events in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Rwanda severely tarnished the UN’s reputation for the failure of peacekeeping forces to effectively enforce the Security Council resolutions or protect civilian life. In the case of Bosnia, around 7,000 men and boys were massacred in and around Srebrenica even though the UN declared it a safe area for the civilians present, and despite having an armed battalion of Dutch peacekeepers present. In Rwanda about 800,000 largely ethnic Tutsi’s were massacred by militant Hutu’s, with the UN failing to act and or even protect those who had sought refuge at UN facilities.

The *Brahimi Report* addresses the issue of mandate enforcement by acknowledging up front that while “consent of local parities, impartially and the use of force only in self-defense should remain the bedrock principles of peacekeeping,” the UN should define impartiality more clearly as adherence to the principles of the Charter. The *Report* then states that “where one party to a peace agreement clearly and incontrovertibly is violating its terms, continued equal treatment of all parties by the United Nations can in the best case result in ineffectiveness and in the worse may amount to complicity with evil.” “No failure did more to damage the standing and credibility of United Nations peacekeeping in the 1990s,” says the *Report*, “than its reluctance to distinguish victim from aggressor.”

One of the themes of the *Brahimi Report* and lessons learned from peacekeeping in the 1990s is that if the UN is to get involved in a peacekeeping mission, it must not only be clear about its role and properly equipped, but also prepared to act if needed to defend or enforce the
mandate and protect the lives of civilians who will seek UN protection. According to the Panel [emphasis mine]:

_This means that United Nations military units must be capable of defending themselves, other mission components and the mission’s mandate. Rules of engagement should be sufficiently robust and not force United Nations contingents to cede the initiative to their attackers._

_This means, in turn, that the Secretariat must not apply best-case planning assumptions to situation where the local actors have historically exhibited worst-case behavior. It means that mandates should specify an operation’s authority to use force. It means bigger forces, better equipped and more costly but able to be a credible deterrent. In particular, United Nations forces for complex operations should be afforded the field intelligence and other capabilities needed to mount an effective defense against violent challengers._

_Moreover, United Nations peacekeepers – troops or police – who witness violence against civilians should be presumed to be authorized to stop it, within their means, in support of basic United Nations principles._ However, operations given a broad and explicit mandate for civilian protection must be given the specific resources needed to carry out the mandate.则

What the above paragraph highlight is the need to resource peacekeepers properly to allow intervention if necessary for defense of the mandate or protection of civilians. And it means being explicitly clear as to the peacekeeping forces responsibilities. _Finally, it means the_
UN and the mission leadership on the ground must be prepared to take sides in a conflict or post-conflict situation and respond with the appropriate force.

These recommended changes in organizational behavior are at the heart of the reforms in the Brahimi Report. The mission failures discussed earlier in Somalia, Bosnia, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone all stem from the UN being unprepared to defend its mandate and/or protect civilians, and highlight the need for the UN to have clear mission mandates, a rapid deployment of effective forces, and a willingness to engage in force.

The following model captures the main features of the Brahimi Report when it comes to reforming peacekeeping operations. The foundation of reform is a willingness on the part of the Security Council, the Secretariat, and the General Assembly to follow through on change in two key areas: defining the mission and providing adequate resources. In doing so, the result is a clear, credible, and achievable mandate along with the possibility of a rapid deployment of effective forces, which means peacekeeper are present in sufficient numbers with the right equipment, proper training, excellent leadership, and a good operational strategy that is versatile enough to respond to events on the ground. All this together allows for the implementation of the mandate, and it’s enforcement if needed, whether that means simply maintaining the peace or engaging in state-building and reconstruction activities, to the protection of civilians. By achieving these two things, the UN may call its intervention a success. With success come greater benefits for the host population and increased standing in the international community and more credibility for the UN as a force for good. By showing it can do the job, there is greater likelihood the UN will be able to assist in other peace support missions. The diagram below displays graphically the foundation and pillars on which effective mandate implementation and a capability for protection of civilians rest.
Summarizing the Brahimi Report

The Brahimi Report contains additional recommendations for improving UN peacekeeping in a variety of areas. These include improving the UN’s information-gathering, analysis and strategic planning capacities; developing more comprehensive peacekeeping doctrine; improving recruitment and retention of personnel; improving public information activities; creating structural adjustments such as separate division for military personnel and civilian police, as well
as field administration and logistics division; and a special “lessons learned” unit, in addition to improved knowledge management practices. A full listing is can be found in Annex III of the *Brahimi Report*.

In October 2000, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan issued a follow up to the *Brahimi Report* discussing the implementation of recommendations. In it he highlighted that he had already fulfilled one recommendation, that of designating a senior UN official to oversee implementation, which he assigned to the Deputy Secretary-General. He also covered the actions he had taken and planned to take to support implementation of the Panel’s recommendations, many of which required legislative approval from the General Assembly, organizational realignments, and increases in funding. In the Secretary General’s follow-up report he individually reviewed each of the *Brahimi Report*’s recommendations and provided a response to each, even when he did not necessarily concur with a specific recommendation. He promised to continue to monitor and discuss implementation and reform in addition to submitting more detailed proposals for action in subsequent reports.

In another report by the Secretary-General, published in December 2001 after a request by the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, he discussed progress made in implementation of the *Brahimi Report*. Of note, he mentioned three separate reviews that have been conducted concerning the amount of resources available to the DPKO, identifying existing gaps that need to be filled to improve managerial systems and processes and better plan, manage, and support future peacekeeping operations while fulfilling current peacekeeping obligations. The Secretary-General also mentioned that as a result of the discussions of reform, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations had settled upon five strategic goals:
• Enhancing the rapid deployment capability for peacekeeping operations;
• Strengthening the relationship with Member States and legislative bodies;
• Reforming the Department’s management culture;
• Reorienting the Department’s relationship with field missions; and
• Strengthening relationships with other parts of the United Nations system.\(^\text{41}\)

The Secretary General also mentioned that some of the *Brahimi Report’s* recommendations have been partially implemented or fully complete, such as providing funds from each mission’s budgets to the head of mission to spend on “quick-impact” projects targeted at enhancing mission effectiveness. For the most part, however, the report discusses a lot of internal discussions on reform, planning committees, future reports that were being prepared, and intended actions as opposed to concrete changes.

In sum, the *Brahimi Report* represents a turning point in history of UN peace support operations, one that has initiated a decade of aggressive reform providing more focus and momentum toward improving the organization’s ability to engage in peacekeeping. The Panel added tremendous value by acting as a catalyst for future change. By taking a hard, honest look at past failures and being willing to provide clear, reasonable explanations of the issues at stake, along with solutions, the *Brahimi Report* went a long way toward improving the practice of peacekeeping and improving the image and credibility of the UN. As will be seen in the following pages, many of the *Report’s* recommendations have now been implemented.
Establishment of the Peacebuilding Commission

and Peace Operations 2010

The first major initiative after the Brahimi Report was the establishment of the UN’s Peace Building Commission, which was adopted in a resolution by the General Assembly following the September 2005 UN World Summit at UN Headquarters in New York. “The main purpose of the Peacebuilding Commission,” it said, “is to bring together all relevant actors to marshal resources and to advise on and propose integrated strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery.”42 Additionally:

The Commission should focus attention on the reconstruction and institution-building efforts necessary for recovery from conflict and support the development of integrated strategies in order to lay the foundation for sustainable development. In addition, it should provide recommendations and information to improve the coordination of all relevant actors within and outside the United Nations, develop best practices, help to ensure predictable financing for early recovery activities and extend the period of attention by the international community to post-conflict recovery. The Commission should act in all matters on the basis of consensus of its members.43

The resolution went on to state that during country-specific meetings of the Commission, members would come from not only the country under consideration for help from the Commission, but other countries in the region engaged in peacebuilding efforts as well as
relevant regional organizations, the representatives of major financial and troop contributing
countries, and regional and international financial institutions. There would also be a standing
organizational committee that would be responsible for developing the Commission’s procedures
and organization matters, and would include members of the Security Council, the UN’s
Economic and Social Council, the top providers of contributions to UN budgets and voluntary
contributions to UN funds, and the top providers of military and civilian police to UN missions,
along with representatives from the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and other
institutional donors. The resolution also called for a small peacebuilding support office to assist
the Commission in its work.

The Commission, according to the UN, is to act as an “intergovernmental advisory to
support peace efforts in countries emerging from conflict, and as a key addition to the capacity of
the International Community in the broad peace agenda.” Its three main functions are:

- Bringing together all of the relevant actors, including international donors, the
  international financial institutions, national governments, troop contributing
countries;
- Marshaling resources; and
- Advising on and proposing integrated strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding
  and recovery and where appropriate, highlighting any gaps that threaten to
  undermine peace.

To achieve this end the Commission has set up a Peacebuilding Fund and the
aforementioned Peacebuilding Support Office. The Peacebuilding Fund, which relies upon
voluntary contributions from Member States, organizations and individuals, provides a source of financing for countries on the Commission’s agenda, provided the countries use the funds to:

- Respond to imminent threats to the peace process and initiatives that support peace agreements and political dialogue;
- Build or strengthen national capacities to promote coexistence and peaceful resolution of conflict;
- Stimulate economic revitalization to general peace dividends;
- Reestablish essential administrative services.46

The Peace Support Office was established to assist and support the Peacebuilding Commission, administer the Peacebuilding Fund, and serve the Secretary-General in coordinating United Nations agencies in their peacebuilding efforts. It contains a Support Section, Policy Planning Section, and a Financing for Peacebuilding Section.

Once a country is on the Peacebuilding Commission’s agenda, it is provided an advocate and is paired with another country which then works with it to secure increased funding at donor roundtables, in addition to greater international attention and political will to strengthen peacebuilding. By the being on the agenda of the Peacebuilding Commission, governments are theoretically held to a higher level of scrutiny in their actions, which assists in them being more transparent and protecting human rights in accordance with international norms.

Currently, only five countries: Burundi, Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau, Central African Republic and Liberia are on the agenda of the Commission.
The other major UN reform initiative to occur in the first half decade after the *Brahimi Report* was the release of the *Peace Operations 2010* reform strategy document, which was published in 2006, one year after the founding Peacebuilding Commission.\(^{47}\) Whereas the *Brahimi Report* is credited with first putting into context the problems facing modern days peace support operations in addition to offering a series of recommendations, the *Peace Operations 2010* strategy incorporates some of the uncompleted reforms from the *Brahimi Report* in addition to new lessons learned in the five years since its publication and sets out an approach to further improve UN peace support operations. It was produced, in part, because the majority of the *Brahimi Report*’s recommendations had been implemented. Those that remained required re-examination and renewal in the light of new developments in peacekeeping.

The document lists five key areas for reform. They are:

- Personnel
- Doctrine
- Partnerships
- Resources; and
- Organization.\(^ {48}\)

Responsibility for the day-to-day coordination and implementation of the *Peace Operations 2010* strategy, along with the establishment of working groups to complete detailed work related to each area was assigned to the Director of Change Management in the Office of the Under-Secretary-General.
For personnel, the main objective of the strategy was to improve the “recruitment and retention of highly qualified personnel by providing the structures and support they would need to build a career as United Nations peacekeepers.”\textsuperscript{49} To do this \textit{Peace Operations 2010} sought new policies to recruit, train, and retain staff with an emphasis on senior mission leadership positions. It also called for plans on improving “leadership and management standards, with clear guidance and policies for conduct and discipline.”\textsuperscript{50} It assigned the DPKO’s Personnel Management and Support Service the task of reviewing the core functions of individual mission positions and realigning responsibility for “recruitment, outreach and roster management to a team independent of the staff selection and placement functions,” which one presumes is meant to make the hiring process more objective. \textit{Peace Operations 2010} also sought a comprehensive review of standard operating procedures governing the recruitment and selection process and the provision of manuals offering clear guidance to human resources employees.

For doctrine, the initiative attempted to do three things: clearly define what peacekeeping can and cannot do; capture accepted best practices; and establish standards for peacekeeping missions along with formulating guidance on how to achieve those standards.\textsuperscript{51} Understanding UN peacekeeping doctrine is important, says the strategy, because it “sets out the accepted and tested practice that forms the basis for guiding staff in their function and responsibilities.”\textsuperscript{52} To achieve this, DPKO had established a system to “continuously collect and analyze practices and experience in the field and at Headquarters.”\textsuperscript{53} These collected lessons learned and the production of guidance materials for peacekeepers will standardize “practices, procedures and guidelines that can be used to facilitate the more effective and efficient interaction of personnel from diverse cultures, background, training and expertise in the mission environment” in addition to providing “greater doctrinal clarity on the standards, expectations and procedures of
the organization which is vital to effective planning, training and mission management in the field.”

To achieve this, the document notes, the Peacekeeping Best Practices Section will invest time to build “underlying foundations and systems for the more effective collection of good practices and lessons learned and link them to the development, coordinating and disseminating of operational policy, procedures and guidelines for United Nations peacekeeping.” This includes development of an Intranet website connecting UN peace operations with both headquarters and each other.

The third area of improving partnerships will be achieved by establishing frameworks to improve interactions across the UN system, in line with the Secretary-General’s Policy Committee guidance that “integration is the fundamental principle of United Nations peace operations.” The major partnership priority in Peace Operations 2010 was to “improve the integrated mission planning process at start-up and throughout the life cycle of a peace operation.” To do this, the DPKO planned to establish “predictable frameworks for cooperation with regional organizations, including common peacekeeping standards, establish modalities for cooperation and transition and, to conduct, where possible, joint training exercises.” It also sought to “further develop its relationship with international financial institutions,” such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund by promoting dialogue, joint training and research projects, and staff exchanges. A final aspect is to enter into a “strategic dialogue” with other UN agencies to clarify roles and responsibilities in integrated missions.

The fourth area of focus is improving the UN’s ability to provide resources for missions. “United Nations peacekeeping succeeds or fails,” the document says, “depending on the
provision of sufficient capacity to implement a mandate.”60 Discussing reforms, Peacekeeping Operations 2010 states that it will focus on strengthening the Police Division and improve its technological capacity, specifically information technology resources, enhancing strategic communication. It will also move forward in creating a standing police capacity and establishing “conduct and discipline units,” throughout peacekeeping mission and at Headquarters. And it will also continue to improve the UN’s ability to rapidly deploy forces by strengthening standby arrangements with contributing countries.

The fifth and final key area in the strategy is improving organizational capacity, specifically, by integrating UN organizational structures at Headquarters and in the field. “Effective peacekeeping,” Peace Operations 2010 says, “requires flexible structures that can evolve over the different phases of the mission, while consistently providing timely and effective support.”61 To this end the reform process has the DPKO examining the “building blocks on which each mission is structured,” and figuring out ways to create “integrated teams to serve as a single backstop for field missions.”62 These integrated teams, the strategy says, will “incorporate political, military, policy, specialist civilian, logistics, financial and personnel expertise, and will be supported by functional expertise to deliver substantive and support tasks, including, but not limited to, conduct and discipline, integrated training, policy, doctrine and guidance, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, and rule of law.”63

Unlike the Brahimi Report, the Peacekeeping Operations 2010 initiative was not a comprehensive document providing a all encompassing examination of existing policy along with recommendations for wholesale change. Rather, it should be seen as a sequel to the Brahimi Report, one that looked at what occurred in the five year interim, and which sought to address certain structural issues in need of improvement and focus on a few key areas within
each. By strengthening these areas, the DPKO hoped to continue to perform existing “mandated
tasks and responsibilities while redefining the manner in which it performs its functions.”

Organizing for Success: The Creation of the Department of Field Support

One of the main findings of the Brahimi Report and one of the key problems in UN
peacekeeping missions (and any mission, UN or otherwise, involving significant military or police
action in a country) is the difficulty of adequately supporting personnel on the ground with the
requisite personnel management, logistical and financial support needed to accomplish mission
objectives.

In order to better provide such assistance to missions, in 2007 the UN undertook a major
structural reform and carved out of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations a separate
supporting organization, creating the Department of Field Support (DFS). Whereas DPKO
provides political and executive direction to UN Peacekeeping operations around the world and
works with Headquarters and the UN’s partners, the job of the DFS is to provide “support in the
areas of finance, logistics, information, communication and technology (ICT), human resources
and general administration to help missions promote peace and security.”

The change was made in resolution 61/256 of the General Assembly, and explained in the
April 2007 Report of the Secretary-General entitled “Comprehensive report on strengthening the
capacity of the United Nations to manage and sustain peace operations.”

When enacted, the UN had over the past three years started nine new operations and was in the process of starting up
three more, and needed both a “major injection of additional resources to keep pace with the
level of peacekeeping activity in the field,” but also a revaluation and change in the way business
was done to improve the UN’s ability to “mount and sustain peacekeeping operations in the face of their growing volume and complexity.”

Some of the problems noted were the excessively long lead times for procurement transactions because of the large number and diverse range of commodities, equipment and services required for missions, along with and the high personnel turnover rate (about 30% each year). To fix these and other problems, the creation of DFS was part of a larger restructuring of DPKO meant to alter the status quo in the hopes of being able to “properly equip the Secretariat to rise to the challenge of the growing volume and complexity of peacekeeping demands,” as well as to ensure that senior officials responsible for meeting those demands were provided with “the commensurate level of resources and authority” needed to do so.

The new DFS is headed by an Under-Secretary-General who takes direction from the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations on matters relating to support of DPKO-led peacekeeping and is empowered in ways that the Office of Mission Support, which previously handled field program delivery, was not, and in ways that would “guarantee unity of command and the integration efforts between the two departments of the DPKO and DFS.”

According to the Secretary-General, the DFS is “responsible for delivering dedicated support to United Nations field operations, including on personnel, finance, procurement, logistical, communications, information technology and other administrative and general management issues.” Additionally, DFS would “be a provider of services to the Departments of Peacekeeping Operations and Political Affairs.” All the responsibilities of the Office of Mission Support would be folded into the DFS.

The new DFS constitutes seven main offices, including a policy evaluation and training division and the United Nations Logistics Base in Brindisi, Italy. It currently provides support
for 16 peacekeeping missions around the globe representation a total of 123,638 personnel. Part of the DFS role is to support the evolution of change on the ground, both in terms of transitions between peacekeeping forces and other actors, and operational demands such as spikes or decreases in the level of instability or expansion of mandates.

Three years after the DFS’s creation, with the organization fully stood up and its administrative and systemic structures put in place, the DFS published in January 2010 the Global Field Support Strategy (GFSS) to further improve personnel, logistical, financial, and other support to field missions.

According to the strategy, the two most critical metrics for successful field support are speed and quality, however, “either or both of these attributes have all too often been absent – resulting in a direct impact on the credibility of the United Nations intervention and the professional standing of the Organization.” The need to improve these two dimensions and transform service delivery in the field is the major purpose of the GFSS, which is comprised of six goals, four of which focus on core, operationally focused objectives, and two of which consider the impact on the deployment footprints of field missions. The four operationally focused objectives are:

- Expedite and improve support for peacekeeping, including critical early peacebuilding;
- Expedite and improve support for peacemaking, electoral assistance, mediation support and conflict prevention;
- Strengthen resource stewardship and accountability while achieving greater efficiencies and economies of scale;
• Improve the safety and living conditions of staff.

The two mission impact objectives are:

• Fully utilize local and regional investment and capacity;
• Reduce the in-country environmental impact of peacekeeping and field based special political missions.

As noted in the GFSS, these changes are “aimed at improving the full spectrum of service delivery, on the one hand providing fast, complete and flexible support to civilian, police and military components deployed in the field, and, on the other, ensuring cost efficiencies and transparency.”

Under the new strategy, the Secretariat would continue to set strategic direction and policy, as well as maintain oversight, but would get out of the business of operational and transactional service delivery while new global and regional service centers would take over these latter functions. This would reduce the mission support component in field missions, limiting their role to “location-dependent activities” performed for their specific missions.

This strategy would also, according to the Secretary-General, achieve “greater levels of efficiency and effectiveness,” and have the effect of reducing mission footprints and risk exposure, improving safety and security and bettering living conditions for civilian support staff, which, in turn, will promote a higher rate of retention and increased productivity. Key to achieving this are sustained and dedicated attention for implementation, Member State approval of the strategy, and the necessary resources to implement. Because of the length of time it takes
to change existing practices, the UN envisions a five year implementation plan and close collaboration between the Secretariat, the General Assembly and filed missions.

**Capstone Doctrine for Peace Support Operations**

In 2008 the UN published one of its most important documents of the decade: *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines*. For the first time, after sixty years of peacekeeping missions, when operations “have been guided by a largely unwritten body of principles and informed by the experience of the many thousands of men and women who have served,” the UN published a manual capturing these experiences “for the benefit and guidance of planners and practitioners of United Nations peacekeeping operations” and outlining its core doctrine.

The manual is split into three sections covering “The Evolution of United Nations Peacekeeping,” Planning United Nations Peacekeeping Operations,” and “The Art of Successful Mandate Implementation.” Combined, they encompass a capstone document peacekeepers can use to inform everything they do, which is more important than ever now as peacekeeping is increasingly being used by the international community as a tool to manage conflict. It is especially important because of the complexity inherent in modern day operations. As the then Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Jean-Marie Guehenno wrote in her foreword:

> Beyond simply monitoring cease-fires, today’s multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations are called upon to facilitate the political process through the promotion of national dialogue and reconciliation, protect civilians, assist in the
disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of combatants, support the organization of elections, protect and promote human rights, and assist in restoring the rule of law.83

The document emerged out of the Peace Operations 2010 reform effort, which “aimed at strengthening and professionalizing the planning, management and conduct of United Nations peacekeeping operations.”84 One of the objectives of producing it was to “ensure that the growing numbers of United Nations peacekeeping personnel deployed in the field, as well as those serving at Headquarters, have access to clear, authoritative guidance on the multitude of tasks they are required to perform.”85 By better understanding the basic principles and concepts of peacekeeping operations, as well as their strengths and limitations, all those involved in peace support operations will be able to perform better and meet mission objectives.

As stated in the introduction, “the present document aims to define the nature, scope and core business of contemporary United Nations peacekeeping operations, which are usually deployed as one part of a much broader international effort to build a sustainable peace in countries emerging from conflict.”86 It is also important to note that the document “sits at the highest-level” of the current doctrine framework for United Nations peacekeeping. “Any subordinate directives, guidelines, standard operating procedures, manuals and training materials issued by DPKO/DFS should conform to the principles and concepts referred to” in the document.87 That said, the document “does not seek to override the national military doctrines of individual Member States participating in these operations and it does not address any military tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs), which remain the prerogative of individual Members States.”88
Part I of the manual begins by discussing the normative frameworks of UN Peace Support Operations, specifically the legal basis for peace support mission action found in Chapters VI, VII and VIII of the UN Charter and the differences between actions the UN can take under each chapter. Also discussed is international human rights law and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights along with the necessity of peacekeeping forces seeking to support human rights in mandate implementation, particularly when it comes to insuring that personnel do not become perpetrators of human rights abuses. International humanitarian law (also known as the “law of war”) is also discussed with emphasis on the requirement of protecting individuals who do not participate or are no longer participating in hostilities. Security Council mandates, from which all peacekeeping missions emanate, are mentioned since they outline the goals of peacekeeping missions, as are the many cross-cutting, thematic tasks assigned to missions, specifically those related to women, children, and the protection of civilians in armed conflict.

Chapters 2 and 3, which make up the rest of Part I, are where the fundamental doctrine and principles lie, whereas the rest of the sections and chapters deal with best practices and lessons learned for implementation. For this reason we will limit our discussions to these two chapters.

Chapter 2 on the evolution of peacekeeping discusses the spectrum of peace and security activities undertaken by the UN and others to achieve peace throughout the world. It goes into definitions of conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and peacebuilding, and where they fall along the spectrum of conflict, as well as the linkages between them. The use of force is also discussed:
United Nations peacekeeping operations may also use force at the tactical level, with the authorization of the Security Council, to defend themselves and their mandate, particularly in situations where the State is unable to provide security and maintain public order.89

It then goes on to a discussion of “robust” peacekeeping and peace enforcement and the use of force at the tactical, operational and strategic levels, stating that while robust peacekeeping “involves the use of force at the tactical level with the consent of the host authorities and/or the main parties to the conflict, peace enforcement may involve the use of force at the strategic or international level” once authorized by the Security Council.90

According to the manual, a key point to understanding peace support operations is to understand that conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace enforcement “rarely occur in a linear or sequential way” and that experience has shown “that they should be seen as mutually reinforcing.”91 “Used piecemeal or in isolation, they fail to provide the comprehensive approach required to address the root causes of conflict that, thereby, reduces the risk of conflict recurring.”92

 Whereas previous UN documents were about reforming structures, this lays it out the current strategic level theory of peace support operations that has resulted from an evolution in doctrine and the way the UN views missions. When discussing the “core business” of UN peacekeeping operations, the manual goes to great lengths to make clear that it involves more than just the tasks assigned to traditional missions (observation, monitoring and reporting, supervision and verification of ceasefires, interposition and confidence building measures). It repeatedly stresses that PSOs have become more complex and “multi-dimensional,” involving a
mix of military, police, and civilian capabilities to support tasks along the spectrum from peace enforcement to peacebuilding in a wide variety of scenarios from existing conflict to fragile peace. Within this context, the “core functions” of UN PSO missions are to:

- Create a secure and stable environment while strengthening the State’s ability to provide security, with full respect for the rule of law and human rights;
- Facilitate the political process by promoting dialogue and reconciliation and supporting the establishment of legitimate and effective institutions of governance;
- Provide a framework for ensuring that all United Nations and other international actors pursue their activities at the country-level in a coherent and coordinated manner.\(^93\)

Among the additional tasks listed as falling under these functions are “operational support to national law enforcement agencies;” “security at key government installations, ports, and other vital infrastructure;” establishing “the necessary security conditions for the free flow of people, goods and humanitarian assistance; and providing humanitarian mine action assistance.”\(^94\) Additionally, as result of the *Brahimi Report*, “most multi-dimensional United Nations peacekeeping operations are now mandated by the Security Council to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence.”\(^95\)

While past keeping missions were about maintaining and sustaining the peace through low impact measures that don’t necessarily address the drivers of conflict, new missions are also charged with “peacebuilding” activities designed to make the peace sustainable. According to
the manual, the chances of a sustainable peace are better secured by addressing four critical
areas:

- Restoring the State’s ability to provide security and maintain public order;
- Strengthening the rule of law and respect for human rights;
- Supporting the emergence of legitimate political institutions and participatory
  processes;
- Promoting social and economic recovery and development, including the safe
  return or resettlement of internally displaced persons and refugees uprooted by
  conflict.96

As noted in the manual, to achieve success in these areas, UN Peacekeeping forces are often
mandated by the Security Council to address them by participating in the following
peacebuilding activities:

- Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of former combatants;
- Mine action;
- Security Sector Reform (SSR) and other rule of law-related activities;
- Protection and promotion of human rights;
- Electoral assistance;
- Support to the restoration and extension of State authority.97
According to the manual, peacekeeping forces that deploy may be required to initiate some of the above activities, however, they are not designed nor equipped to carry them out over the long-term, especially when it comes to institution capacity building efforts. This is usually the work of “development actors within the UN Country Team, as well as key partners outside the United Nations, who have the resources and technical expertise required to effectively undertake long-term institution and capacity-building activities.”

Even so, the experience has been that the United Nations has in some cases had to institute the long-term capacity building efforts because other actors have been unable to take the lead, usually due to security reasons and/or resource constraints. Regardless of what it does, PSO missions do their best to support other actors and “preparing the ground” for them, including all those within and outside the UN system, so that they can take on these critical long-term activities.

One of the reasons that it is important to facilitate and empower the activities of other actors, according to the manual, is that by doing so UN forces can support the “promotion of socio-economic recovery and development and the provision of humanitarian assistance, which are two critical areas in which multi-dimensional United Nations peacekeeping operations play a more limited supporting role.” Support for socio-economic development is crucial because it is necessary for a sustainable peace. Without economic growth and job creation, for instance those who have been demobilized from fighting forces cannot find alternative livelihoods that provide income for them and their families, and refugees and internally displaced persons are unlikely to return to their homes. Without social development via truth and reconciliation commissions or education supporting harmony among warring factions, conflict may one day break out again. These are things the UN peacekeeping force cannot necessarily achieve, as it is not one of their
comparative advantages, but by supporting civilian partners who are experts with long experience in these areas, missions can go a long way toward moving the country they are in toward achieving them.

Chapter 3 of the *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines* discusses applying the basic principles that have been the foundation UN peacekeeping missions since they began, namely, that of consent of the parties, impartiality, and non-use of force except in self-defense and defense of the mandate. Each of the three basic principles is covered in-depth.

When it comes to consent of the parties, the manual notes, UN peacekeeping field missions are only deployed when the main parties have committed “to a political process and have accepted a peacekeeping operation mandated to support that process.” It’s important to have this backing, because without it, the UN “risks becoming a party to the conflict; and being drawn towards enforcement action, and away from its intrinsic role of keeping the peace.” To maintain the perception of impartiality, the UN “must work continuously to ensure that it does not lose the consent of the main parties, while ensuring that the pace process moves forward.” This also includes building trust among the parties so that consent is not withdrawn, which results in the rational and core assumptions for the UN mission being made invalid.

The manual reminds the peacekeeper that just because consent of the “main parties” is achieved for a UN mission, this does not mean all local actors support it. This is especially true if the main parties are weak or internally divided, or if there are additional armed groups not under the control of the parties. In order to “forestall any wavering of consent” in the country, peacekeepers should “continuously analyze its operating environment.”
On the issue of impartially, it is key that UN officials implement the mandate “without favor or prejudice to any party.” This is particularly important when it comes to maintaining consent and achieving host nation cooperation, however, it should not be confused, says the manual, “with neutrality or inactivity.” UN Peacekeepers, it says, “should be impartial in their dealings with the parities to the conflict, but not neutral in the execution of their mandate.”

The issue of impartiality has evolved, especially in light of peacekeeping failures in the 1990s, where some UN contingents used it as an excuse of inaction. “Just as a good referee is impartial, but will penalize infractions, so a peacekeeping operation should not condone actions by the parties that violate the undertakings of the peace process or the international norms and principles that a United Nations peacekeeping operation upholds.” That said, just as with needing consent of the parities for cooperation and good relations, “a peacekeeping operation must scrupulously avoid activities that might compromise its image of impartiality.” Doing so puts both the mission and peacekeepers at risk. Before acting, says the manual, “it is always prudent to ensure that the grounds for acting are well-established and can be clearly communicated to all.” Failing to do so, “may undermine the peacekeeping operations’ credibility and legitimacy, and may lead to a withdrawal of consent for its presence by one or more of the parities.”

If forced to intervene in a way that one of the parties may perceive as impartial, the mission must do so “with transparency, openness and effective communication as to the rationale and appropriate nature of its response.” Doing so “will help to minimize opportunities to manipulate perceptions against the mission, and help to mitigate the potential backlash.” No matter the correctness of the decision, “referees,” which is what the manual sees UN missions as
being, “should anticipate criticism from those affected negatively and should be in a position to explain their actions.”

As with the issue impartiality, the third principle of non-use of force, which dates back to the very first deployment of armed peacekeepers in 1956, has evolved due to the changing nature of missions. Originally, force was supposed to be used only for self-defense, however, it has expanded now to include defense of the mandate, as the principle of the non-use of force had been keeping peacekeeping operations from effectively carrying out its duties when resistance attempts by armed spoilers arose to challenge or thwart peacekeepers.

Since UN missions are deployed in situations of instability, to include non-party militias and criminal gangs as well as others armed groups, there may be instances in which spoilers seek to undermine the peace or threaten civilians. In such contexts, the Security Council authorizes “robust” mandates giving peacekeeping forces the authority to “use all necessary means” to prevent attempts to derail the political process or protect civilians. “By proactively using force in defense of their mandates,” says the manual, “these UnitedNations peacekeeping operations have succeeded in improving the security situation and creating an environment conducive to longer-term peacebuilding in the countries where they are deployed.”

The manual also makes a distinction between robust peacekeeping at the tactical level and strategic level peace enforcement.

Robust peacekeeping involves the use of force at the tactical level with the authorization of the Security Council and consent of the host nation and/or the main parties to the conflict. By contrast, peace enforcement does not require the consent of the main parties and may involve the use of military force at the
Regardless of the type of force used, the manual maintains that it only be used as a measure of last resort after all other means have been exhausted. And it should be remembered, according to the manual, that the ultimate aim of the use of force “is to influence and deter spoilers working against the peace process or seeking harms civilians; and not to seek their military defeat.”\textsuperscript{116} Any use of force should be “calibrated in a precise, proportional and appropriate manner, with the principle of the minimum force necessary to achieve the desired effect, while sustaining consent for the mission and its mandate.”\textsuperscript{117} UN forces, says the manual, “should always be mindful of the need for an early de-escalation of violence and a return to non-violent means of persuasion.”\textsuperscript{118} Finally, says the manual it is incumbent upon mission leadership to ensure all personnel in the mission understand the rules of engagement and are applying them appropriately.

Aside from these principles, Chapter 3 lists three other success factors that are crucial if a mission is to succeed. These are the need to be perceived as 1) legitimate and 2) credible by the host country population, and 3) the promotion of local and national ownership of the peace process.

Legitimacy is a crucially important asset of peacekeeping missions, one they are given by virtue of working under a Security Council mandate, who the international community has given authority for maintaining international peace and security. Losing this legitimacy serious jeopardizes the mission. As noted in the manual:
The manner in which a United Nations peacekeeping operation conducts itself may have a profound impact on its perceived legitimacy on the ground. The firmness and fairness with which a United Nations peacekeeping operation exercises its mandate, the circumspection with which it uses force, the discipline it imposes upon its personnel, the respect it shows to local customs, institutions and laws, and the decency with which it treats the local people all have a direct effect upon perceptions of its legitimacy.

The perceived legitimacy of a United Nations peacekeeping operation is directly related to the quality and conduct of its military, police and civilian personnel. The bearing and behavior of all personnel must be of the highest order, commensurate with the important responsibilities entrusted to a United Nations peacekeeping operation, and should meet the highest standards of efficiency, competence and integrity. The mission’s senior leadership must ensure that all personnel are fully aware of the standards of conduct that are expected of them and that effective measures are in place to prevent misconduct.

Making sure the peacekeepers behave appropriately is a key component of maintaining legitimacy amongst the host country population, which could erode due to a variety of factors, such as an inability to maintain stability or move the peace process forward.

Credibility, the second of the success factors, is crucial as earlier on and throughout the deployment an operation it “is likely to be tested for weakness and division by those whose interest are threatened by its presence.” By establishing credibility early, the mission can “help
to deter spoilers and diminish the likelihood that a mission will need force to achieve its mandate.”

Of course, a UN mission must be credible, meaning it is deployed rapidly, is properly resourced, and has skilled personnel in place to “maintain a confident, capable and unified posture.” It also requires a “clear and deliverable mandate,” as well as a “sound mission plan that is understood, communicated, and impartially and effectively implemented at every level.”

Part of credibility means managing expectations, which will likely be high among the local population when the mission arrives. “A perceived failure to meet these expectations, no matter how unrealistic, may cause [the mission] to become a focus for popular dissatisfaction, or worse, active opposition.” Furthermore credibility lost is hard to get back, and by having low credibility or losing it, whether because of the weakness of the mission force or a lack of effectiveness, there will be negative effects on the mission’s legitimacy and the consent of the parties, in addition to a negative effect on the morale of mission personnel, who may become less effective, thereby creating even more problems.

Finally, because UN peacekeeping missions are meant to help countries emerging from conflict, usually internal, there needs to be a high level of national and local ownership in the maintenance of stability and following the peace process if the UN mission is to succeed. This includes everything related to post-conflict reconstruction and development. “In planning and executing a United Nations peacekeeping operation’s core activities,” says the manual, “every effort should be made to promote national and local ownership and to foster trust and cooperation between national actors.” By building national and local ownership as well as partnerships, the UN can improve the legitimacy of the peace process and the UN mandate, as
well as “help to ensure the sustainability of any national capacity once the peacekeeping
operation has been withdrawn.”126

Missions should always be careful to remember, says the manual, that “multiple
divergent opinions will exist in the body politic of the country,” and that all “opinions and views
need to be understood, ensuring that ownership and participation are not limited to small elite
groups.”127

Chapter 3 ends with a discussion of the activities of multi-dimensional United Nations
peacekeeping missions, and states that the prime task of missions is “to restore, as soon as
possible, the ability of national actors and institutions to assume their responsibilities and
exercise their full authority, with due respect for internationally accepted norms and
standards.”128

Issues such as deciding on when to deploy peacekeeping operations and planning them, as
well as starting, managing, supporting, sustaining, and transitioning them, make up the rest of the
manual. Combined, they provide a series of useful concepts for understanding implementation,
as well as recommendations for those in Headquarters and the field for successfully carrying
them out. They deal more with the “how” for achieving specific tasks rather than higher level
concepts or actual reforms in doctrine or structural change, and for this reason are not covered in
this paper.

Reforming Peacekeeper Conduct and Discipline Policy

In addition to issues dealing with policy and doctrinal changes to make UN missions more
legitimate and credible, along with operational level structural changes at headquarters and the
field to reform policies and procedures to make implementation more efficient and effective, all of which have been covered in a series of reports and strategy documents, there have been efforts specifically targeting the individual behaviors of peacekeepers at the lowest levels, specifically when it comes to how they treat members of the local population. Just as failures at the top can lead to animosity to fulfill the mission mandate, so can problems caused by a small number of tactical level peacekeepers whose individual actions may have strategic consequences that tarnish the mission’s image, thereby causing it to lose legitimacy, and creating the conditions that make effective implementation more difficult.

Such problems arise more often than not from allegations of misconduct against peacekeeping personnel in the areas they operate, and can range from not showing enough respect to the population to crimes and human rights violation such as rape and murder. One area of misconduct most commented upon in recent years is the “sexual exploitation” of local women by UN peacekeepers.

In order to maintain good conduct and discipline, since 1998 peacekeeping missions have issued uniformed personnel with pocket cards detailing the “Ten Rules: Code of Personal Conduct for Blue Helmets,” a collection of rules guiding the behavior of everyone in the mission. Peacekeepers are also issued “We Are United Nations Peacekeeping Personnel” cards which provide 28 general principles peacekeepers must abide by, ranging all the way from being prepared to accept “special constraints” over their public and private lives while serving as peacekeepers, to behaving in a professional and disciplined manner at all times.

While conduct and discipline has always been an issue, concerns came to a head in 2004 after allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse by UN peacekeepers in the Congo. After the allegations surfaced, the Secretary-General commented that “it became clear that the measures
currently in place to address sexual exploitation and abuse in peacekeeping operations were manifestly inadequate and that a fundamental change in approach was needed.”132 This led to a committee led by Prince Zeid Ra’ad Zeid Al-Hussein of Jordan, himself a former peacekeeper, to issue comprehensive report calling for “radical change in the way the problem of sexual misconduct is addressed in peacekeeping contexts,” along with recommendations on preventing sexual exploitation and abuse by United Nations peacekeeping personnel.133 The subsequent report, known as the Zeid Report, dealt with four main areas of concern:

- The current rules on standards of conduct;
- The investigative process;
- Organizational, managerial and command responsibility; and
- Individual disciplinary, financial and criminal accountability.134

The Zeid Report begins by analyzing the problem in the context of peacekeeping missions, which more often than not occur in broken down and traumatized societies still somewhat immersed in or emerging from conflict, thereby by making it easier for sexual exploitation to occur, whether through consensual transactional sex arrangements for food or money, to non-consensual sexual abuse. It then highlights the negative ramifications of peacekeepers engaging in such behaviors on the legitimacy of the mission. “Indeed,” write the report’s authors, “a peacekeeping operation cannot legitimately advise the Government on adherence to international human rights standards and legal and judicial reform if its own peacekeeping personal are engaging in acts of sexual exploitation and abuse, including such crimes as rape.”135 Furthermore, in addition to the legitimacy problems, such behavior opens
mission personnel up to blackmail and violence retaliation, as well as sexually transmitted
diseases and HIV/AIDS.

The report then claims that one of the main difficulties in dealing with allegations of
sexual misconduct against peacekeepers is that the rules of the UN state that troop-contributing
countries have jurisdiction over their own soldiers when it comes to conduct and discipline. The report goes on to recommend that UN rules regarding sexual incidents be applied uniformly
to all categories of peacekeeping personnel, both civilian and military, and that troop-
contributing countries in their Memorandum of Understanding with the UN be required to accept
and adhere to UN policy on investigating those accused of sexual misconduct and appropriately
disciplining contingent members when found guilty.

Another issue brought up in the report is the need for a permanent professional
investigative capacity within the UN system to “investigate complex cases of serious
misconduct, including sexual exploitation and abuse.” As of the writing of this paper no new
special organization has been created and current responsibility for investigating allegations of
misconduct fall under the UN’s independent auditing arm, the Office of Internal Oversight
Services. One concept discussed as being of extreme importance was the necessity for troop-
contributing countries to participate in the investigation of allegations so that they can help
investigations meet their own standards of evidence and be confident that the investigation was
properly conducted and evidence gathered in conformity with their own laws, particularly since
any judicial action will occur back home. One recommendation by the panel was also to have
“on-site” court martial for serious offenses, as that would allow for greater access to witnesses
and evidence and could demonstrate to the local community that those engaged in sexual
misconduct will be punished.
Taking responsibility across all levels of the organization in preventing sexual misconduct was also a key feature of report, with recommendations for extensive training programs both for peacekeepers and local community members to raise awareness and prevent sexual misconduct, as well as make it easier for individuals to make complaints in a confidential setting. In order to better track investigations and their ultimate outcomes, the report recommended the institution of a data collection system and new staff positions at headquarters and in the field to coordinate action on sexual misconduct issues. The Zeid Report also recommended increasing the percentage of female peacekeeping personnel, believing it would “facilitate the mission’s task of making meaningful contact with vulnerable groups and non-governmental organizations in the local community in its effort to eliminate sexual exploitation and abuse.”

One key aspect of the report was recognizing the role leaders play in preventing and responding to sexual abuse, first by creating an environment that minimizes the risk of such events occurring, but also in taking appropriate action when allegations are made. “Managers who make a good-faith effort to deal with the issue of sexual exploitation and abuse must be rewarded by appropriate notations in the performance appraisal mechanisms used to address their suitability for higher office,” the report says. Above all, the report says, there should be a “zero tolerance” policy for sexual exploitation and abuse and managers must be informed that “they will be held strictly accountable for introducing measures that seek to prevent such abuse.”

Perhaps the biggest problem in dealing with peacekeeper misconduct, notes the report, is dealing with individual accountability. Regardless of whether the individual is a soldier from a troop-contributing country or a UN civilian, making sure the charge is properly adjudicated and if guilty, the perpetrator punished, is ultimately outside the control of the UN. By statute all
military personnel must be tried by their own country, and for UN civilian personnel, while the
UN can terminate their employment, it is up to the host nation or the individual’s home country
to prosecute the case. This becomes difficult because laws are different in each country. In
some, prostitution is legal, or there are higher standards of evidence in order for a case to be
tried. Furthermore, if a crime did occur, it did not occur against a citizen of the home country,
and the cost of a trial, which may not be able to occur due to lack of evidence or properly
collected evidence, may create a disincentive for prosecutors to try the case. Additionally,
civilian personnel in some cases have immunities similar to that accorded diplomats, and from a
technical standpoint this immunity must be waived by the Secretary-General. If waved,
however, and the host country wishes to prosecute, the UN must ensure that the rule of law exists
and the accused civilian will receive a fair trial in addition to having his or her human rights
respected if found guilty. This is not easy to achieve in a country immersed in or emerging from
conflict or in which there is a history of judicial corruption and a lack of the rule of law or
prisons that meet international standards. As the report notes, there are no easy answers,
however, it recommends that the Secretary-General appoint a group of experts to provide ideas
as to how to deal with individual civilian accountability and suggest the possibility of drafting an
international convention for that purpose.145

Today, as a result of the Zeid Report and other efforts, such as a 2008 assistance strategy
for complainants and verified victims of sexual abuse (and any resulting children), there is an
increased emphasis on preventing and investigating incidents of sexual misconduct, as well as
holding the individuals, leaders, and the organization as a whole responsible.

Perhaps the most important outcome of the Zeid Report was the creation, a year after its
release, of the UN DPKO’s Conduct and Discipline Unit, which is a sub-organization of the
Department of Field Support. The unit maintains oversight of the state of discipline in peacekeeping missions and “provides overall direction for conduct and discipline issues in field missions, including formulating policies, training and outreach activities and handling allegations of misconduct.” Additionally, it maintains a global database and confidential tracking system for all allegations of misconduct.

The New Horizon Initiative and the Future of Reform

The most recent UN reform initiative was launched in July 2009 in the release of a “non-paper” produced by the DPKO and DFS as a “consultative document” meant to contribute to “an ongoing discussion about the future direction of UN peacekeeping and how this unique instrument can continue to serve the international community and the millions of people that look to it for support.”

Titled *A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for United Nations Peacekeeping* and referred to as the New Horizon Initiative (NHI), it is built on previous peacekeeping reform efforts and has two main purposes:

- First, assess the major policy and strategy dilemmas facing UN Peacekeeping today and over the coming years; and then
- Reinvigorate dialogue between stakeholders on possible solutions to better tailor UN Peacekeeping to meet existing and future requirements.

Among the goals of the New Horizon Initiative is to “renew” the global partnership for UN peacekeeping among the Secretariat, members of the Security Council, the General Assembly, contributors of personnel and financial resources, and every other stakeholder from within and outside the UN system, and to forge a policy agenda that reflects integrates the
perspectives of each group. It has three lines of action meant to achieve shared understanding and unity of purpose of the challenges to peacekeeping and appropriate responses. Taken directly from the paper, they are:

- **A partnership in purpose:** a shared vision of the purpose of UN Peacekeeping and a more inclusive approach to designing, planning and managing UN Peacekeeping missions.

- **A partnership in action:** agreed approaches and capacities required to implement this vision on the ground and to deliver critical tasks, as well as manage crises.

- **A partnership for the future:** a collective dedication to building and sustaining the right capabilities for UN peacekeeping into the future, by examining new ways of drawing on global resources and flexible, innovative measures to deploy, support and sustain peacekeepers in the field.\(^{150}\)

The NHI paper states that since the release of the *Brahimi Report* eleven years ago, there has been a “five-fold growth” in UN PSOs over the last decade.\(^{151}\) Because the “scale and complexity of peacekeeping today are straining its personnel, administrative and support machinery,” and because new “political, military and financial challenges threaten to erode the unity of vision and purpose of the global peacekeeping partnership,” there is a need to renew the partnership and develop “a shared agenda [which is] essential to ensuring that UN peacekeeping can meet the challenges of today and tomorrow.”\(^{152}\) By bringing together UN PSO stakeholders and having them work towards achieving agreement and unity of action along the three line of
action, the NHI hopes to enable the UN to meet those challenges, especially since, according to the paper, “there is no sign that the need for peacekeeping will diminish.”

According to the non-paper, the major problem with modern day peacekeeping is that “the scale and complexity of peacekeeping today are mismatched with existing capabilities.” Though the NHI builds on the reforms of the *Brahimi Report, Peace Operations 2010*, the reorganization of DPKO and the creation of the Department of Field Support, the NHI non-papersaysthat the demands of PSOs “over the past decade have exposed the limitations of past reforms and the basic systems, structures and tools of an organization not designed for the size, tempo and tasks of today’s missions.” The main cause of this, it suggests, is that each new PSO is built “voluntarily and from scratch on the assumption that adequate resources can be found and is run on individual budget, support, and administrative lines.”

The NHI non-paper states that peacekeeping is a “core function,” of the United Nations, and for this reason, “a piecemeal approach” to resourcing missions “is not an option.” What peacekeeping ultimately needs, according to the NHI, is a “more predictable, professional and adaptable capabilities.” In short, it “needs a global system to match the global enterprise it has become” and therefore “a new and comprehensive way of doing business is required.”

By generating discussion and spurring action the creators of the NHI hope to “renew” UN peacekeeping and match capabilities to tasks. If it is to be successful, the non-paper says, there must be a “common vision and mutual accountability of all peacekeeping partners,” as this is “the basis for unity of purpose and effective action,” and “the foundation for building capacities for the future.”

Each of the three lines of action mentioned above is split into sub-elements meant to provide greater clarity on what is needed for achieving the NHI’s partnership goals. For
partnership in purpose, the goal is “a shared vision of the purpose of UN peacekeeping,” which can be considered a “prerequisite for capable and effective action on the ground,” one necessary to strengthen “the direction, planning and management of UN peacekeeping.”

To better achieve this, the initiative calls for a “clear political strategy and direction” as a crucial sub-element before the onset of missions, in addition to “cohesive mission planning and management.” According to the non-paper, sustained dialogue and exchange “between the Secretariat and Member States and between the field and headquarters are central to sound mission planning and management.” Such actions can strengthen planning and management. Under this sub-element the report also calls for strengthening consultation mechanisms, the clarification of information and reporting requirements to “enhance accountability and clarity in purpose,” and “the establishment of relevant and realistic benchmarks on the ground” to facilitate management and monitoring.

Partnership in action is needed, so says the non-paper, in order to “enhance delivery and the confidence of UN peacekeeping to implement that tasks it has been assigned.” The three sub-elements needed to strengthen the UN’s ability to do so, are “faster deployment,” “clarity and delivery on critical roles,” and better “crisis management,” and will only improve if consensus on policy and requirements are achieved by stakeholders.

In the third line of action, “partnership for the future,” the NHI calls for building dependable and sustainable PSO capabilities to “serve as a global peace and security instrument,” well into the future. It has four sub-elements, the first of which is the requirement of “projecting future needs.” “Because future demands are unknown and uncertainty about available global resources render the task of defining the future needs of UN peacekeeping inherently difficult,” any future requirements “will need to be considered in the
context of a constrained fiscal environment.” It is essential this be done, however, because “UN peacekeeping remains a comparatively inexpensive provider of post-conflict security and demand for the tool is unlikely to falter.” In order to meet potential future demand, however, “a new and comprehensive approach to resource generation and incentives required to deliver results in the field,” will have to be considered.

The second sub-element of developing “a capability-driven approach” looks toward reforming personnel and equipment management practices to improve capabilities and then tying them to “the task they are required to perform,” in the field. This will also require the development and agreement of “standards and their systematic linkage to training, equipping and delivery on the ground.”

“Expanding the peacekeeping partnership,” is the third sub-element, and calls for an expanded number of troop contributors to “enhance collective burden-sharing, in addition to increased cooperation between the UN and other regional organizations such as the African Union and the European Union in the hopes it will “maximize finite global peacekeeping resources.”

The final sub-element of the NHI is “a new field support strategy.” “The complex, fast-paced nature of UN peacekeeping today requires a new approach that emphasizes innovation, flexibility and accountability in support systems,” says the non-paper, which also notes that development of a new field support strategy is already underway. This strategy, it says, “will seek delivery and management improvements at global, regional and mission levels,” and also includes “the shared use of assets and the creation of regional service centers; a better use of technology to support lighter, more agile deployment; and improved financial arrangements for
greater operational flexibility." For improvements to be made, however, there must be “active and sustained engagement of all partners.”

**The New Horizon Initiative Progress Report**

One year after the release of *A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for United Nations Peacekeeping*, DPKO and DFS presented their first and only progress report on reform, released in October 2010. Reflecting on their achievements, Alain Le Roy, the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations and Susana Malcorra, the Under-Secretary-General for Field Support, noted that “through dialogue, the gap has been narrowed and common ground has been built among those who mandate peacekeeping operations; those who contribute to peacekeeping with personnel, equipment and financial resources; those who plan, manage and execute operations; and those who partner with UN peacekeeping operations to deliver on the ground.” The progress report also mentions areas where the UN could have done better, such as “strengthening the linkages to peacebuilding and mediation” and providing better “policy, financial, administrative and logistics support” to UN missions on the ground. The progress report notes that once the dialogues at the center of the NHI began that four priority areas quickly identified themselves as being the focus of peacekeeping reform:
Additionally, the progress report took note of the new “intensified consultation process” among stakeholders, and lists the many debates, meetings, briefings, discussions, workshops, seminars, and working groups that have been put together to hammer out reform issues. The report also highlighted the development of a mechanism for more “systematic triangular consultations” between the Security Council, troop and police contributors, and the Secretariat. Similarly, also discussed are the UN legislative initiatives and reports that have been released dealing with peacekeeping.

Much of the rest of the progress report is a rehash of the information about the nature, challenges, and needed reforms of peacekeeping that are found in the original non-paper introducing the New Horizon Initiative. For the most part, however, not much has been done in the intervening year since its release, and as a result, the progress report does not much have substance to relate, and can only report on consensus of needed reforms and the number of
reports and discussions held. A second report has not been issued, but one wonders if it will come out in October 2011, a year after the first progress report, and if it will be an annual event until the New Horizon Initiative is replaced with some other UN reform program.

CONCLUSION

Major Themes from a Decade of Reform

UN peace support operations have continuously evolved from their beginnings as simple observation and monitoring missions, then transitioning to armed intervention forces meant to oversee peace agreements, to becoming the modern, multi-dimensional operations of today, charged with a variety of tasks, including peace enforcement and the protection of civilians. As a result they have become more complex, with many more actors involved, and have increasingly become more resource intensive, with the added burden of being under the glare of a 24-hour media microscope.

Major changes to the way the UN conducts peacekeeping were spurred at the beginning of the new millennium as a result of a series of missteps and failures from several operations in the 1990s which showed UN peacekeeping in a bad light and caused many to question whether or not they were worth doing. These include the UN’s inability to protect civilians in Rwanda and Srebrenica, as well failures in Somalia. While initiatives have been taken for reform throughout the UN’s history, the game changer was the creation in 2000 of a high-level panel to “undertake a thorough review of United Nations peace and security activities, and to present a clear set of specific, concrete and practical recommendations to assist the United Nations in conducting such activities better in the future.”179 The report of that panel, subsequently
referred to as the *Brahimi Report* after the panel’s chairman, Lakhdar Brahimi, laid the foundation for a decade of true reform that continues on to this day.

The *Brahimi Report* covered all aspects related to peacekeeping and issued 57 different recommendations, the most important of which dealt with *improving the mandate formation process; ensuring the rapid and effective deployment of forces; and shifting doctrine to account for the new realities of modern day multi-dimensional peace support operations*. These three issues summed up the major problems with UN peacekeeping: poorly crafted, overly expansive and impossible to achieve mandates; an inability to properly resource missions or get them to the field in time to make a difference; and a general lack of understanding about the features and challenges of current missions. The good news is that since the *Brahimi Report* was released, the UN has made substantial improvement in both mandate formation (particularly in terms of more consultations with stakeholder groups and an better awareness of what missions can actually achieve) and shifting doctrine, yet it still falls short when it comes to the rapid and effective deployment of forces.

One of the outgrowths of *Brahimi Report* was the UN’s Peacebuilding Commission, a new body created in 2005, the main purpose of which was “to bring together all relevant actors to marshal resources and to advise on and propose integrated strategies for post-conflict peace building and recovery.”\(^{180}\) The commission supports, upon request, countries that are emerging from conflict by bringing together relevant actors, marshaling resources, and advising on strategies for peacebuilding and development. It acts as an advocate for specific countries and pairs them with others which then work to secure increased funding at donor roundtables, in addition to promoting greater international attention and political will to strengthen the cause of peacebuilding.
In 2006, a half-decade after the release of the *Brahimi Report*, the UN released its *Peace Operations 2010* strategy. In addition to offering a series of recommendations, *Peace Operations 2010* incorporates some of the uncompleted reforms from the *Brahimi Report* in addition to new lessons learned in the five years since the latter’s publication and sets out a strategy to further improve UN peace support operations. It was produced, in part, because the majority of the *Brahimi Report’s* recommendations had been implemented and those that remained required re-examination considering new developments in peacekeeping.

The document listed five key areas of reform: Personnel, Doctrine, Partnerships, Resources, and Organization. *Peace Operations 2010* sought, over five years, to improve the “recruitment and retention of highly qualified personnel by providing the structures and support they would need to build a career as United Nations peacekeepers.”

It also looked to clearly defining what peacekeeping can and cannot do, capturing accepted best practices, establishing standards for peacekeeping missions, as well as formulating guidance on how to achieve those standards. To strengthen partnerships the strategy sought to establish frameworks to improve interactions across the UN system and establish “predictable frameworks for cooperation with regional organizations, including common peacekeeping standards, establish modalities for cooperation and transition and, to conduct, where possible, joint training exercises. Finally, it worked toward improving the UN’s ability to provide resources for missions; and integrate UN organizational structures at Headquarters and in the field. Unlike the *Brahimi Report*, the *Peacekeeping Operations 2010* initiative was not a comprehensive document providing an all encompassing examination of existing policy along with recommendations for change, but rather, a sequel that looks at what has occurred in the five year since the *Brahimi Report* and addresses certain structural issues in need of improvement and focus on a few key areas within
each. The most recent strategy document after *Peacekeeping Operations 2010* is the current New Horizon Initiative.

One of the key problems in UN Peacekeeping according to *Brahimi Report* was the problems it came to providing administrative, financial, and logistical support to field missions. To resolve these issues in 2007, the UN created the Department of Field Support. Whereas DPKO provides political and executive direction to UN Peacekeeping operations around the world and works with Headquarters and the UN’s partners, the job of the DFS is to provide “support in the areas of finance, logistics, Information, communication and technology (ICT), human resources and general administration to help missions promote peace and security.”

The DFS is widely credited as improving the level of assistance provided to field missions and has crafted strategy documents of its own, the most recent of which was published in January 2010.

In 2008 the UN released one of its most important documents of the decade, the *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines*. For most of the last sixty years of peacekeeping missions operations had “been guided by a largely unwritten body of principles and informed by the experience of the many thousands of men and women who have served.” In publishing the new manual, the UN for the first time captured these experiences “for the benefit and guidance of planners and practitioners of United Nations peacekeeping operations” and aimed to “define the nature, scope and core business of contemporary United Nations peacekeeping operations.” As noted in the documents introduction, it “sits at the highest-level of the current doctrine framework for United Nations peacekeeping” and any “subordinate directives, guidelines, standard operating procedures, manuals and training
Other reforms to peacekeeping over the last decade include changes meant to improve peacekeeper conduct and discipline which were instituted after allegations of misconduct. The UN created a commission to look into addressing these issues, and the resulting Zeid Report, named after the commission’s chairman, discussed not only the difficulties in achieving justice when peacekeepers and UN civilians fall under various jurisdictions, but also in collecting evidence and conducting investigations at the appropriate standards to safeguard the rights of the accuse. As noted in the report there is no easy way to achieve justice when allegations of soldier misconduct present themselves, but there are steps the UN can do to mitigate instances of misconduct occurring, such as increased ethics training and an emphasis by leaders on preventing misconduct in their organizations.

The most recent UN reform attempt, the New Horizon Initiative, began in 2010, with the goal of renewing peacekeeping among all stakeholder groups by first assessing the major policy and strategy dilemmas facing peacekeeping, and then reinvigorating dialogue on solutions “to better tailor UN Peacekeeping to meet existing and future requirements.” The New Horizon Initiative is about two years old and has released one progress report already with another expected later this year. It remains to be seen what ultimate reforms it will accomplished aside from increasing discussion about the future and challenges of UN peacekeeping.

There are many reform successes the UN can point to after the last decade. Nowadays, there is more of an appreciation for the limits of UN peacekeeping missions and a better understanding of the need to craft mission mandates appropriately and not give missions tasks for which they are not properly resourced or which they cannot reasonably accomplish. Greater
definition of UN doctrine has also occurred, to include a doctrinal manual on principles and concepts on peacekeeping. Two new organizations have been created: the Department of Field Support and the Peacebuilding Commission, and reforms have been made to improve peacekeeper conduct and discipline. Finally, perhaps most importantly, the UN continues to engage in aggressive reform, with the recently released New Horizon Initiative. Looking back, while many challenges still remain, including further improvements needed particularly when it comes to resourcing missions, there has been much good accomplished and UN peace support operations are better positioned for future attempts improving international peace and security.
ENDNOTES


5 The five permanent members of the UN Security Council are China, France, Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States. The other ten members are elected by the General Assembly to serve out two year terms.


8 Ibid.

9 Ibid.

10 Ibid.


15 Ibid, Pg. viii

16 Ibid, Pg. 1

17 Ibid, Pg. 10

41 Ibid, Pg. 4


43 Ibid, Pg. 24


48 Ibid, Pg. 6

49 Ibid, Pg. 6

50 Ibid, Pg. 6

51 Ibid, Pg. 7

52 Ibid, Pg. 7

53 Ibid, Pg. 7

54 Ibid, Pg. 7

55 Ibid, Pg. 8

56 Ibid, Pg. 8

57 Ibid, Pg. 8

58 Ibid, Pg. 8-9

59 Ibid, Pg. 9

60 Ibid, Pg. 9

61 Ibid, Pg. 9

62 Ibid, Pg. 9-10

63 Ibid, Pg. 10

64 Ibid, Pg. 6


Ibid, Pg. 4

Ibid, Pg. 7

Ibid, Pg. 7

Ibid, Pg. 7

Ibid, Pg. 24

Ibid, Pg. 24

Ibid, Pg. 24


Ibid, Pg. 2

Ibid, Pg. 3

Ibid, Pg. 3

Ibid, Pg. 3

Ibid, Pg. 4


Ibid, Pg. 9

Ibid, Pg. 6

Ibid, Pg. 6

Ibid, Pg. 6

Ibid, Pg. 8

Ibid, Pg. 9
Ibid, Pg. 9
Ibid, Pg. 19
Ibid, Pg. 19
Ibid, Pg. 20
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Ibid, Pg. 33
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Ibid, Pg. 33
Ibid, Pg. 33
Ibid, Pg. 33
Ibid, Pg. 34
114 Ibid, Pg. 34

115 Ibid, Pgs. 34-35

116 Ibid, Pg. 35

117 Ibid, Pg. 35

118 Ibid, Pg. 35

119 Ibid, Pg. 36

120 Ibid, Pg. 37

121 Ibid, Pg. 38

122 Ibid, Pg. 38

123 Ibid, Pg. 38

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125 Ibid, Pg. 39

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132 Ibid, Pg. 1

133 Ibid, Pg. 9

134 Ibid, Pg. 2

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136 Ibid, Pg. 4
Source Website for office of investigative services.


For more information on the DPKO’s Conduct and Discipline Unit, please see the following website: http://cdu.unlb.org/AboutCDU/OurMandate.aspx

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167 Ibid, Pg. v
168 Ibid, Pg. v
169 Ibid, Pg. v
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184 Ibid, Pg. 8

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United Nations. *A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping.* (Jul. 2009),


For a comprehensive look at all aspects related to UN peacekeeping, including links to source materials, strategy documents, a history of peacekeeping past and present, mission formulation processes, along with biographies, organizational descriptions and current mission statuses, please see the following website: